August 12, 2009

August 10, 2009

July 27, 2009

  • For JediBear

    Pick your Artist:
    Gordon Lightfoot

    Are you a male or female:
    Ordinary Man

    Describe yourself:
    Don Quixote

    How do you feel:
    Looking At The Rain

    Describe where you currently live:
    Somewhere, U.S.A.

    If you could go anywhere, where would you go:
    Biscuit City

    Your favorite form of transportation:
    Hi’way Songs

    Your best friend is:
    The Pony Man

    You and your best friends are:
    Brave Mountaineers

    What’s the weather like:
    High and Dry

    Favorite time of day:
    Sundown

    If your life was a TV show, what would it be called:
    East of Midnight

    What is life to you:
    Songs the Minstrel Sang

    Your last relationship:
    Beautiful

    Your fear:?
    Cold Hands From New York

    What is the best advice you have to give:
    Waiting for You

    Thought for the Day:
    If You Could Read My Mind

    How you would like to die:
    On The High Seas

    Your soul’s present condition:
    Restless

    Your motto:
    Welcome to Try

June 24, 2009

June 22, 2009

  • Term Paper Mania II: Shasta Dam!

    “But I Don’t Want It To Pop: The Import, Construction, and Future of the Shasta Dam”

    California is blessed with a wide variety of terrain, weather, resources, and people. Unfortunately for the state, historical forces worked against it, sending most of the people to the far south while most of the resources, namely water, remained in the north. At the dawn of the twentieth century the people of California had decided to take it upon themselves to correct that small inconsistency in geography. Over the course of the next forty years, canals, aqueducts, reservoirs, and cisterns were constructed throughout the state to send the bounty of the north’s supply of dihydrogen monoxide to the dry and thirsty lands of Los Angeles and the San Joaquin. One of those efforts was the Central Valley Project, the most ambitious one to date, and one of the major keystone facilities is the Shasta Dam and Reservoir. A microcosm of California’s trials and triumphs, challenges and concerns, it was undertaken as not just another New Deal public works project, but had California’s own particular flair for ascetics, dramatics, and grandeur.

    The Sacramento River is, like most California rivers, a seasonal river; its flow changes over the year as its watershed is fed more by runoff from snowpack and the glaciers of Mt. Shasta, rather than a steady source of rainfall. That rainfall, however, is not spread out evenly over the state. Due to the prevailing weather patterns of the North Pacific, the Sacramento River valley receives twice the rainfall of the San Joaquin River valley.[1] However, the southern area of this Central Valley is prized for its longer growing season, which can be up to three weeks longer when measured at the extremes of the valley. During the early part of the rainy season, the precipitation falls as snow on the northern Sierra Nevada and southern Cascades. At the end of this period, however, the temperature has risen and the rain is supplemented by melt waters and therefore the Sacramento River is prone to flooding, far more than the San Joaquin.[2] These floods would be severe in 1924 and 1925, wiping out timberland in the Kenneth region and covering the soil with ashen mud, making it “oxygen poor.”[3] This seasonable flow and its attendant floods had an impact farther downstream, in the Sacramento River’s delta as it entered San Francisco Bay. As the bay expanded its dockside infrastructure, it was noticed that during the dry period, when the river was at its lowest, that the saltwater from the bay would back up into the delta causing severe problems. This backflow damaged the ecosystem of the delta and the farming that went on in the area surrounding it (now mostly rice and tomatoes), introduced salt water organisms that were not planned for (a teredo, a wood-burrowing saltwater worm, infestation destroyed docks in the Suisun bay area), and deprived the cities of Pittsburg and Antioch of their municipal water supplies when the salinity reached a high of 65% of the ocean.[4]

    By the 1930s, the need to control the Sacramento River was self evident, and since the river was to be controlled, why not harness it as well for work? Californian voters were presented a proposal of unprecedented size, a billion dollar project that would create a huge system of dams, levees, and canals that would span the length of the state. The Central Valley Project was sent to the voters in 1933, where it was approved even as the Great Depression was occurring.[5] The state was unable to completely raise the bonds necessary to finance the project, but the new FDR administration stepped in with New Deal money through the Bureau of Reclamation, the repayment schedule defined within the Harbours and Rivers Act of 1937, which made it subject to the 160 acre-feet limit for free water.[6]

    The money secured, the dam was planned and constructed, and what a dam it was. Only one site, the Kenneth site, was ever seriously considered and surveyed, and a compacted base was set up that would support a dam 800 feet high.[7] This height was never reached, however, as it was decided to cap the dam at the 602 foot mark, with the possibility of expansion in the future.[8] Like most large dams of the era, it was a curved-concrete gravity dam, but due to the seismic nature of California, the amount of concrete poured made it the second largest dam by volume in the United States, second only to the Grand Coulee Dam on the Colombia. As such, there were bound to be problems and delays in its construction. Right from the start, there was consternation from labor. Since the money had come from the Federal Government rather than the state, the Bureau of Reclamation insisted that federal wage scales were to be used for union contracted labor.[9] The first work stoppage occurred when the construction of the Southern Pacific Railroad (SPRR) bridge was halted, trying to link the rail and road improvements and detours to the dam project proper.[10] Labor itself slowed progress on the construction of the dam when the conflict between the AFL and CIO spilled onto the spillway, halting work on the concrete sluices that guided the water around the dam site in 1939. Mother Nature had something to say about the project as well. An above average stream flow halted work in 1938, a precursor to a far more destructive flood in 1940, which killed a dozen or so people.[11] Finally, the 1940s brought on new delays: material shortages due to the war effort. In 1940, some of the steel to be used in the dam was diverted for shipbuilding. 1941 brought shortages in concrete. By 1942, mobilization had robbed the site of most of its initial workforce.[12] Work continued until, finally, on 20 June 1945, the Bureau of Reclamation accepted the dam at a finish height of 602 feet.

    Shasta Dam and Reservoir is representative of other public water works in California during this period. Many of the larger dams and water projects were designed to be impressive and offered distinct designs to make them more appealing – California flair. The Mulholland spillway fell down into Los Angeles into the San Fernando Valley, a series of steps making a tiered waterfall that could have been served just as well by a plain sluice or a grey pipe, as evidenced by the pipes at the Kern County Grapevine pumping station.[13] The Hollywood Reservoir sat behind a curved dam that offered breathtaking views of Los Angeles; after the collapse of the similar St. Francis Dam, the Mulholland Dam was reinforced by earthworks to the point where it looks like a natural feature of the area.[14] Even some of the smaller projects were done with an eye for the dramatic, such as the art-deco Sepulveda Dam.[15] When the engineers accessorized Shasta Dam, they gave it a large central spillway. Capable of releasing 186,000 cubic feet of water per second, the 487 foot contained spillway in the center of the dam became the tallest man made waterfall.[16] The infrastructure was also given a touch of the artistic as well. The overpass for Interstate 5 over the main section of Shasta Lake sits at a significant height over the water level, the roadway laid in anticipation of an 800 foot dam, providing a panoramic view of the lake. In addition, a sly civil engineer laid out the northbound bridge with a particular aim: Once the roadway levels out to traverse the lake’s valley, the northbound traveler finds himself driving almost directly toward the 14,162 foot stratovolcano, Mt. Shasta, which dominates the skyline.[17] These touches to a civil works project are fascinating looks into the flair of Californian civil works projects, starting with the ambitious Golden Gate.

    The job complete, the lake, dam, and river was put to work. Massive hydroelectric plants were installed at the base of the dam to utilize the flow of water. When the original complex was done, five generators powered by the Sacramento generated a peak output of one hundred forty two thousand kilowatts in 1954. In the 1990s, utilizing money from the California Valley Project Improvement Act, these old generators were replaced. Brand new and modern designs replaced the long-serving turbines and output was increased to six hundred fifty nine thousand kilowatts, a 460% increase in electrical generation.[18] The National Parks Service, coupled with its California counterpart, turned the lake into a huge recreational area. Shasta Lake became known for its beautiful scenery, fishing, a large houseboat community in the early 80s, and for attractions such as the Shasta Caverns on the McCloud arm.

    All this development, however, has brought its share of challenges. People moved to the north valley in significant numbers during the construction, and communities such as Redding exploded with new residents. As noted, the rail and road lines were routed above the lake surface instead of around it, and as such, still serves as the primary connection between California and the cities and farming communities of Oregon and Washington. Coupled with associated pollution from the growth of mining, logging, and agriculture in the area, the upper Sacramento has become closely monitored for pollution, as it feeds into the reservoir.[19] The dangers involved with this came into sharp focus when a train derailed, sending a car filled with the pesticide VAPAM (sodium methyl dithcarbonate) into the Sacramento just south of Dunsmuir in 1991. Once in the water, reactions turned it into MITC (methyl isothiocyanate) which was devastating to the fish population in the river.[20] This substance entered the reservoir on the Sugarloaf arm, and sank into the lake. The lake is large enough to become “stratified”, with various thermal layers separating waters of different density. The chemical became buoyant at a depth of eight to twelve meters and remained there.[21] As the MITC spread into the lake, it passed through a special aerating station, used to oxygenate the water for the fish. Oxygen is a catalyst, and as the chemical passed by, the station’s process vastly increased the breakdown of the chemical into less-than-toxic forms.[22] The study of the process after the accident became a cautionary tale (the tank car was unmarked) and provided a system for dealing with large chemical spills into water supply reservoirs.[23]

    The final challenge awaiting Shasta dam is the future. California is struggling to provide enough water for its increasing population, and existing reservoirs are being strained to provide it. Studies are being undertaken now to examine the feasibility of raising Shasta Dam by up to eighteen and a half feet.[24] This would drown another two thirds of a mile of the McCloud River, well loved by sport fishermen, naturalists, and the Winnemem Wintu tribe. The tribe claims that since it never received recognition from the Federal Government during the initial construction, its efforts to preserve their culture and access to sacred lands has been limited; further sacred areas would be placed underwater if the dam was expanded. Sport fishermen lament the loss of some of the most sought after fishing locales in the state; the rivers are dotted with lodges and camps. Naturalists want the state to concentrate on other water projects, smaller reservoirs, and ocean desalinization plants.[25] Wrangling over these issues killed a study on the expansion of the dam in 1982; the Bureau of Reclamation admits little is likely to happen in the near future.

    In a state where water and power is king, Shasta Dam sits rightly so as the crown jewel of the state’s biggest water project. Almost seven million cubic feet of concrete have tamed one of the more quirky rivers in America. In the process, several things happened. Large amounts of electricity were generated, industry and communities were created and expanded, and water was stored for lean times and controlled during floods. A whole recreational complex was created, done with the simple panache that California had brought to its public works projects. With success have come problems, however. The communities that have expanded have increased traffic in the area, increasing pollution as industry has risen. Transportation on a large scale still passes north and south across the lake, and accidents such as the 1991 Dunsmuir spill, while infrequent, are inevitable. Finally, California itself has grown beyond the capacity of the dam itself. The state looks to expand upon its strong base for future growth, but opposition has marshaled its forces to preserve the area from further development. It is in this light that the state of California looks north and ponders its future under the shadow of Mount Shasta.


     

     

    Bibliography

    Beardsley, G. F., and W. A. Cannon. “Note on the Effects of a Mud-Flow at Mt. Shasta on the Vegetation.” Ecology, April 1930: 326-336.

    Bureau of Reclaimation – Central Valley Project Overview. 2009. http://www.usbr.gov/dataweb/html/cvp.html (accessed June 6, 2009).

    CVP – Shasta/Trinity River Divisions. http://www.usbr.gov/dataweb/html/shasta.html (accessed June 6, 2009).

    Darling, Dylan. “Shasta Dam expansion plan: Flood of concerns.” Redding Record Searchlight. February 19, 2007. http://www.redding.com/news/2007/feb/19/flood-concerns/ (accessed June 6, 2009).

    Freeland, Kathleen. “Examining the Politics of Reclamation: The 1944 Acreage Limitation Debate in Congress.” The Historian v. 67 no. 2, Summer 2005: 217-233.

    “Google Earth.” 2009.

    Gu, Roy, and Se-Woong Chung. “A Two-Dimensional Model for Simulating the Transport and Fate of Toxic Chemicals in a Stratefied Reservoir.” Journal of Enviromental Quality, vol. 32, 2003: 620-633.

    “LA Aqueduct Cascades.” Water Education Foundation, March 8, 2008.

    “Sepulveda Dam.” Mokwella, June 12, 2004.

    Steeds, Clinton. “Lake Hollywood Reservoir.” July 10, 2008.

    Stene, Eric. Central Valley Project Shasta Division – History. 1994. http://www.usbr.gov/dataweb/html/shastah.html (accessed June 6, 2009).

     


     

     

     



    [1] Bureau of Reclaimation – Central Valley Project Overview. 2009. http://www.usbr.gov/dataweb/html/cvp.html (accessed June 6, 2009).

    [2] Bureau of Reclaimation – Central Valley Project Overview.

    [3] Beardsley, G. F., and W. A. Cannon, “Note on the Effects of a Mud-Flow at Mt. Shasta on the Vegetation,” Ecology, April 1930: 333

    [4] Bureau of Reclaimation – Central Valley Project Overview.

    [5] Freeland, Kathleen, “Examining the Politics of Reclamation: The 1944 Acreage Limitation Debate in Congress,” The Historian v. 67 no. 2, Summer 2005: 219

    [6] Freeland, 220.

    [7] Stene, Eric, Central Valley Project Shasta Division – History, 1994, http://www.usbr.gov/dataweb/html/shastah.html (accessed June 6, 2009)

    [8] Stene, Eric, Central Valley Project Shasta Division – History

    [9] Stene, Eric, Central Valley Project Shasta Division – History

    [10] Stene, Eric, Central Valley Project Shasta Division – History

    [11] Stene, Eric, Central Valley Project Shasta Division – History

    [12] Stene, Eric, Central Valley Project Shasta Division – History

    [13] “LA Aqueduct Cascades.” Water Education Foundation, March 8, 2008

    [14] Steeds, Clinton, “Lake Hollywood Reservoir,” July 10, 2008

    [15] “Sepulveda Dam.” Mokwella, June 12, 2004

    [16] Stene, Eric, Central Valley Project Shasta Division – History

    [17] “Google Earth,” 2009.

    [18] CVP – Shasta/Trinity River Divisions, http://www.usbr.gov/dataweb/html/shasta.html (accessed June 6, 2009).

    [19] Gu, Roy, and Se-Woong Chung, “A Two-Dimensional Model for Simulating the Transport and Fate of Toxic Chemicals in a Stratefied Reservoir,” Journal of Enviromental Quality, vol. 32, 2003: 620

    [20] Gu, Roy, and Se-Woong Chung, 621.

    [21] Gu, Roy, and Se-Woong Chung, 627.

    [22] Gu, Roy, and Se-Woong Chung, 628.

    [23] Gu, Roy, and Se-Woong Chung, 620.

    [24] Darling, Dylan, “Shasta Dam expansion plan: Flood of concerns,” Redding Record Searchlight, February 19, 2007, http://www.redding.com/news/2007/feb/19/flood-concerns/ (accessed June 6, 2009)

    [25] Darling, Dylan, “Shasta Dam expansion plan: Flood of concerns,”

June 19, 2009

  • Grades are out, so it’s TERM PAPER MANIA!

    All For One, and Zollverein
    Customs Unions and German Unification Efforts, 1815-1870 and 1945-2008.

    The German people have been known to history since the time of the Roman Empire, yet the idea of a German state had not truly coalesced until the formation of the German Empire in 1871. This state would be dismantled in 1918 after its loss in the First World War and its replacements would be practically razed to the ground in the Second World War. Yet, despite being decimated twice in thirty years, by the 1960s Germany was once again among the premier powers in the world, setting upon a familiar course. German unification in the beginning had occurred through the means of a customs union, the Zollverein, which used economics to promote internal unity; Germany would use another customs union in the 1970s to ensure international security, unity, and its place as the economic engine of a continent, the European Union.

    Germany at the dawn of the 1800s was a fragmented pseudo-nation known as the German Confederation, the remnants of the old Holy Roman Empire. Formed in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, the city-states and larger duchies were compelled by the Treaty of Westphalia to hold a congress of the states in the old free city of Frankfurt-am-main. This was done largely so that the larger, more established and uniform states such as Britain, Russia and France would have a central place to go and present items of international interest to the Germans, rather than sending envoys to each and every duchy and free city. The largest and most powerful state in this system was the Kingdom of Prussia, whose ambitions had been severely set back by the French invasions under Napoleon. Needing to raise revenue and state income, the Prussian government enacted several economic reforms, such as eliminating tariffs between Prussian states and enacting uniform tariffs among the states regarding foreign goods. This unified customs model would serve as the next phase in Prussian political aims: the customs union or Zollverein.[1] Prussia looked at the fractured, disunified nature of Germany and, reeling from the early 1800s, felt that there was little to stop France if they ever decided to invade again.[2] The pride of the individual states, however, remained an obstacle. Continuing with a long tradition of regional pride, they were reluctant to join or trust any union other than the German Confederation, which failed to exert any serious authority over them, even to the point of a lack of a unified German presentation at the Great Exposition in London in 1851.[3] Political aims could not be met through the Confederation’s Bund, so Prussia embarked on using the idea of a customs union to bring together the German states together economically first, then using Prussia’s primacy to unite them politically.[4] The first step was a treaty with Hesse-Darmstadt, in which Prussia would further its political aims by granting this small duchy economic concessions which did not benefit the overall Prussian economy.[5] The treaty increased the tariff frontier of Prussia, (who’d agreed to cover the additional costs) and opened Prussian markets to Hessen goods without reciprocation. This seemed like a good deal for the duchy of Hesse-Darmstadt, but when Prussia concluded treaties with the southern German states that took away some of the Hessen’s markets, they found that despite their protests there was little they could do. The time since the treaty, only a scant two years, had already tied them politically, as well as economically, to Prussia.[6] Meanwhile, the attractive terms of the treaty had already lured other states into pursuing similar arrangements with Prussia, gaining their customs union significant “market share” as other such systems were beginning to come to fruition.[7]

    This expansion of Prussian power began to concern Austria, who saw itself at the time as the premier state of Germany, what with the vast resources of its non-German empire at its disposal. Prussia, however, saw Austria as a cultural rival and not as a military or political enemy.[8] As long as their influence within the Confederation and the various custom unions could be contained, the government in Berlin was more interested in maintaining cordial relations with Vienna. Austrian attempts to influence the Confederation lead it to back the states of the Rhine-Main region to form the Middle German Commercial Union (MGCU) in response to the customs unions of Prussia and Bavaria.[9] This came for naught, however, when the northern and southern economic blocs declared “economic war” against this upstart bloc. Prussia funded railroads and highways from the northern ports into Bavaria that obviated the rivers that ran through the MGCU, driving shipping away from the Rhine and the Elbe and tariffs from their coffers.[10] Prussia then launched aggressive, divide and conquer negotiations with MGCU members, undercutting their own customs union and driving them into the northern economic bloc. Even when the MGCU protested, as the duchy of Hanover did, the Prussian government used its power in conjunction with Bavaria’s to quash any investigation by the Confederation’s Bund, especially since any investigation would have shown that Prussia would have owed reparations and concessions to the MGCU.[11]

    This was not the only challenge to the emerging Zollverein; internal dissent would flair in the 1850s by Saxony. Industrialization had vastly increased the number of concerns in the duchy, and when it signed on to the Zollverein, the rate of plant openings increased again. Within five years of joining the Zollverein, 102 factories of various types had opened within the borders of Saxony.[12] The duchy had little choice to join, as a small and landlocked industrial area it needed the resources of Prussia’s Silesian lands as well as the ports of Danzig and Kiel for their exports.[13] Pushing them into accepting was the fact that Hesse-Darmstadt’s early adoption of the customs union with Prussia had allowed them to undercut Saxon concerns.[14] By the time of the collapse of the MGCU, Saxony was the industrial cog in the Prussian commercial machine. This position was not enough for Saxony to exert its independence in foreign affairs; however, it could use its economic position to influence the course the Zollverein would take.[15] Under its confrontational Prime Minister Buest, Saxony took up the role of loyal opposition within the customs union. In 1862, citing the longstanding concerns that the German states had held, Saxony blocked Prussia’s push for a Franco-German trade agreement.[16] By fostering this role, coupled with the rise of industrial solidarity with the collapse of the Free Trade Unions (guilds), Saxony served as the stronghold of the Social Democrats party which would play a significant role in German politics until their dissolution by Adolf Hitler in 1933.[17]

    All of this served to shape perceptions about what Germany was, both to Germans and outsiders. Internally, talk about the “kleindeutche” (small Germany) solution to German reunification was integrally tied to the forms, functions, and offices of the Zollverein.[18] German newspapers took the reports of the German exposition displays from London and Paris and presented them to their readers, not as examples of regional pride, but of a new nationalism.[19] In addition, experiences in administrating the customs union brought a new and respected worker to Germany: the bureaucrat. As the Zollverein grew and more oversight was needed to run the increasingly complex system, the government became a significant employer in its own right.[20] From outside, the more unified states were having difficulty in dealing with the various German states. The German Confederation was confusing; sometimes its needs and desires were at odds with its powerful member Austria, who had its own empire to run.[21] In these instances, France and Britain looked to any alternative to the Bund in dealing with north-central Europe. The only other significant pan-German organization was the Zollverein, which not only was independent of Austrian influence but was being far better run than the collapsing structure of the German Confederation.[22]

    With the collapse of Wittenberg resistance to the Zollverein in 1855, the customs union represented the majority of the states in the “kleindeutch” region.[23] The goals of the Zollverein shifted away from the economic warfare road and rail construction and concentrated on transportation that not only unified the country, but would promote the quick transport of military troops across the region.[24] The omnipresent French threat finally brought about the unification of Germany; the Zollverein’s bureaucracy served the German Empire well after the Franco-Prussian war of 1870. While the military had ended the “French threat”, Bernstorff stated that it would be the economic strength of the union that would be the “guarantor of security.”[25]

    That security was casually tossed aside when the system of alliances trapped Europe into the launch of the First World War. With most of the conditions that caused the war triggered automatically by provisions invoked by Russian mobilization to support Serbia, four years of war had devastated Germany… and the aftermath would finish the job. The resulting depression would lead to the rise of the Nazi party and the Second World War, and the physical as well as economic devastation of Germany. In the aftermath of this second calamity, the Allied powers in the West showed they’d learned the terrible lesson of the Versailles treaty. Rather than squeezing the German stone for blood, American aid poured into Germany in the form of the Marshall Plan. This launched the Wirtshaftswunder, the economic miracle of Germany.[26] The aid in rebuilding, coupled with the return of investments, brought the old European economic engine back to life. But as Germany regained prominence, once again the Franco-German question returned. Security between the two states was nominally guaranteed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, but now security was defined in economic terms. The European Economic Community formed in 1950 to direct the various economic policies of European nation states. This was pushed heavily by France and Germany for different political reasons. France wanted to gain a perceived political control over Germany which, coupled with the restrictions on the German military, was believed to check any potential future ambitions of Germany.[27] Germany wanted to show its good faith, to stand as the good citizen running the powerplant of Europe’s prosperity.[28] This agreement between the fifteen nations would have a long term political ramification for Germany.

    In 1990 the Soviet Union collapsed and Eastern Europe found itself free of its hegemony. Without the power of the Red Army, it was only natural for the two Germanys to want to reunite. Practically the whole of Europe had questions on just what that would entail, especially given the past history of the first half of the century. Germany would, like Prussia in the early days of the Zollverein, commit to economic concessions in furtherance of political goals.[29] The unified Germany would give up the most visible symbol of its economic prosperity, the Deutche Mark, and adopt the common currency of the European Union, the Euro.[30] Internally, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) shouldered the burden of integration and reconstruction of East Germany, running a significant public debt totaling 1.5 trillion Marks in 1992.[31] The new combined nation had to deal with issues then that strove to use economics to provide internal cohesion. The West German social benefit structure was extended to all East Germans, who appreciated it, but longed for the days of guaranteed employment under the GDR.[32]

    After absorbing this impact upon the nation, the Germans had to deal with the consequences of European Union membership and integration. Internally, the former East German industries were picked over, the best integrated into large West German concerns and leaving the East Germans with limited means to compete internationally with the remains.[33] These companies had long been economically tied to their former Comintern partners, yet these old ties fell to the desire of the newly western-looking countries to want authentic “Western” goods as opposed to the good, but inferior, East German products.[34] As the combined European economy had grown and the German workforce aged, new areas of labor had to be found. Looking for cheaper labor, German companies looked to the periphery of the EU. Jobs in steel stamping, for example, were hindered by the German union’s 35 hour work week and the inability to expand the labor force. Expansion, therefore, took place in the “poorer” and less industrialized areas of the EU, such as Catalonia, Spain and Ireland. Lower skilled work was farmed out to the former Comintern nations on Germany’s border. Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland served German industry much the same way as the Mexican maquiladoras are used to farm out small-parts work for American industries.[35]

    The German nation has navigated these difficulties in the years since 1992, and stands at the center of a trading bloc more unified than its counterparts in North America or East Asia.[36] Its products are desired in Germany’s “home area” more than any other nation, and made better than average progress in foreign penetration than the Americans, if less than the Japanese.[37] It has done so, however, not because of the invisible hand of capitalism, but because of the coupling of politics and economics to achieve real and specific goals that further the cause of the nation. Germany’s citizens are covered under an excellent welfare “safety net” that is not Communist; it provides the basic needs for a healthy citizenry.[38] Germany has managed its debt load to absorb the decrepit Eastern state and still retain its primacy in Europe’s economy through sound political management. Finally, the Germans have reassured their former opponents from the turn of the century that it is ready to assume a peaceful leadership position in a cooperative security structure that is as much political as it is founded on the prosperity of the component nations of the European Union. In the 1830s, the Germans set out to use the Zollverein to unify a country; in the 21st century it is set to use the same technique to unify a continent.


     

     

    Bibliography

    Balaam, David, and Michael Veseth. Introduction to International Political Economy. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Pearson / Prentice Hall, 2008.

    Bazillion, Richard. “Economic Integration and Political Sovereignty: Saxony and the Zollverein, 1834-1877.” Canadian Journal of History, August 1990: 189-213.

    Decressin, Jorg. “Germany’s Wirtschaftswunder Struggle.” Business Economics, July 2007: 21-28.

    Green, Abigail. “The Zollverein at the World Expositions, 1851-1862.” Journal of Modern History, Vol 75, No. 4 Dec. 2003: 836-863.

    Markovits, Andrei, and Alexander Otto. “German Labor and Europe ’92.” Comparative Politics, Vol 24, No 2 (Jan. 1992): 163-180.

    Murphy, David. “Prussian Aims for the Zollverein, 1828-1833.” Historian, Winter 1991, Vol. 3 Issue 2: 285-303.

    O’Loughlin, John, and Luc Anselin. “Geo-Economic Competition and Trade Bloc Formation: United States, German, and Japanese Exports, 1968-1992.” Economic Geography, Vol 72, No 2 (Apr. 1996): 131-160.

    Schulz, Brigitte. “Globalization, Unification, and the German Welfare State.” International Social Science Journal, Volume 163, 2000: 39-50.

     

     



    [1] Murphy, David, “Prussian Aims for the Zollverein, 1828-1833,” Historian, Winter 1991, Vol. 3 Issue 2: 285.

    [2] Murphy, 285.

    [3] Green, Abigail, “The Zollverein at the World Expositions, 1851-1862,” Journal of Modern History, Vol 75, No. 4 Dec. 2003: 846.

    [4] Murphy, 285.

    [5] Murphy, 286.

    [6] Murphy, 286.

    [7] Murphy, 286.

    [8] Murphy, 287.

    [9] Murphy, 287.

    [10] Murphy, 288.

    [11] Murphy, 289.

    [12] Bazillion, Richard, “Economic Integration and Political Sovereignty: Saxony and the Zollverein, 1834-1877,” Canadian Journal of History, August 1990: 192.

    [13] Bazillion, 194.

    [14] Bazillion, 197.

    [15] Bazillion, 202.

    [16] Bazillion, 209.

    [17] Bazillion, 210.

    [18] Green, 837.

    [19] Green, 837.

    [20] Schulz, Brigitte. “Globalization, Unification, and the German Welfare State.” International Social Science Journal, Volume 163, 2000: 41.

    [21] Green, 843.

    [22] Green, 846.

    [23] Green, 856.

    [24] Murphy, 290.

    [25] Murphy, 291.

    [26] Decressin, Jorg. “Germany’s Wirtschaftswunder Struggle.” Business Economics, July 2007: 22.

    [27] Balaam, David, and Michael Veseth, Introduction to International Political Economy, Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Pearson / Prentice Hall, 2008: 230.

    [28] Balaam and Veseth, 230.

    [29] Balaam and Verseth, 230.

    [30] Balaam and Verseth, 230.

    [31] Schulz, 49.

    [32] Schulz, 43.

    [33] Schulz, 44.

    [34] Schulz, 47.

    [35] Schulz, 47.

    [36] O’Loughlin, John, and Luc Anselin, “Geo-Economic Competition and Trade Bloc Formation: United States, German, and Japanese Exports, 1968-1992.,” Economic Geography, Vol 72, No 2 (Apr. 1996): 143.

    [37] O’Loughlin and Anselin, 143.

    [38] Schulz, 43.

June 15, 2009

  • Crossing Bifrost

    Is up.

    Yay! I hope to get a lot of stuff done over the next five weeks of vacation. That’s a lot of gaming, comics, videos, and other sundry stuff to do. Hopefully there’ll be a Miniature Rules up later this afternoon, and a Bread Box as well! Hurray!

    Flipside.

June 8, 2009

June 3, 2009

  • Update about no updates

    Sorry, finals crunch. And my health, she’s not so good. I’m sleeping in little 2-hour bites. I’ve got 2 papers to do, and seven days to do them in. After that, though, I’m back on the CBT train.

    Thanks for your patience.

    DCG.

May 5, 2009